Ancient[ edit ] General and strategist Sun Tzuin his The Art of War 6th century BCwas one of the first proponents of the use of guerrilla warfare. Caratacusthe British war chief, employed guerrilla warfare against the Romans for approximately 8 years, mixed in with occasional set-piece battles. Although Caratacus was ultimately captured by the Romans, Tacitus writes that many Romans respected him.
One Nature, Many Characters page pdf. Insurgency, or irregular war, and warfare are global phenomena, and they always have been. I am providing an Anglo-American perspective because that is what I am and know best.
This can appear to bias an analysis because it cannot avoid implying that COIN and counterterrorism CTand especially some pathologies in trying to deal with them, are unique to us. When Ralph Peters urges a bloody, attritional approach on one of his more colorful days, he is talking the language of Roman generalship under Vespasian and his son Titus in their brutal suppression of the Jewish Revolt in Palestine in AD 66— Irregular warfare is an old, old story, and so are the methods applied to wage it, on both sides.
Irregular warfare, of necessity in common with its Thucydidean motives, is about political power: That may seem a banal point, but really it is not. COIN is about the control of people and territory, not the remaking of civilizations, or even cultures. Crusaders make bad policy makers; they tend to be disinterested in strategy.
Also, speaking as a strategist, I have a professional dislike for impossible missions. Even if I do the wrong thing, I like to think that I can succeed. The revolution in military affairs RMA project has suffered from providing very expensive answers to an unknown question, at least to a question that was hugely underexamined.
But now, with COIN and the irregular challenge, the defense community again has a challenge it believes it can get its teeth into.
The problem is that some challenges are much more taxing than others. To excel at COIN, for Americans, is infinitely more difficult than to excel at regular conventional warfare. In Britain, we tend to use quarter measures when half measures are called for.
In the United States, the error lies in the opposite direction. In the troubling words of that distinguished American political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard, writing in the Weinberger-Powell era of the mids: One of our great advantages is our mass; we should not hesitate to use it.
Bigness, not brains, is our advantage, and we should exploit it. If we have to intervene, we should intervene with overwhelming force. Huntington reflected the ethos of the mids, but also—the reason I quote him—he does suggest a reason why the United States has had a hard time with COIN.
Of course, the contexts have changed, and every work of theory, founded on the experience of the life and times of its author, is stuffed full of inappropriate as well as much good advice. No matter, when COIN—or whatever is the challenge of the hour -- is king, whatever is to hand is rushed to the front to serve.
Every piece of fashionable jargon, every execrable acronym, every dodgy idea is hijacked for the bandwagon. The bandwagon now is COIN. To cite but a few of the lightweight notions that are pretending to be heavy metal: The defense community has made the remarkable discovery that what in Britain we call grand strategy -- in the United States, national security strategy -- is a good idea.About the CCRP The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) has where Irregular Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Operations A.
While the characteristics of warfare changes, its nature is immutable. This Revolution in Military Affairs, later called Transforma-. of warfare from one who lived and fought as a guerrilla for most of I The Nature of Revolutionary Guerrilla War 3 II Profile of a Revolutionist 12 lii Strategy, develop an anti-VtJcstern character definitcly tinged, in our own hemisphere at least, with a distinctive anti-American.
Irregular warfare is defined in US joint doctrine as “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.”. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric warfare approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode the adversary’s power, influence, and will.
begin by establishing a criteria for irregular warfare by briefly discussing its nature and origins. The purpose then is to establish whether the strategy of One of the strategies of irregular warfare is Gray, C.
Irregular warfare: one nature, many characters. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 1 . 9 days ago · The changing character of warfare has imposed the need for a change in the way armed forces approach warfare. of the nature of irregular warfare, the Nigerian Air Force and, indeed, the.
The Changing Nature Of Warfare, The Factors Mediating Future Conflict, And Implications For Special Operations the range of military operations between irregular warfare and of Nature and Character of War and Warfare - Fort Studying the nature of war and the character of warfare will How well do recent doctrinal revisions consider the.